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
Terrorism and Tourism in Bali and Southeast Asia

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Introduction

Michel Houellebecq's controversial novel *Platform* (2002) manages to combine a lurid account of sex tourism with a horrific terrorist attack in Thailand. The book's protagonist Michel, who coincidentally bears the same first name as the author, falls in love with Valérie, an employee of a struggling tour company. On their return to Paris they embark on a love affair in which Michel persuades Valérie and her boss to devote their company's hotels in Thailand and the Caribbean to sex tourism. The new package holidays prove to be popular, especially with Germans, portrayed in the book as stupid and uncultured. One of Michel's characteristics is his rabid and senseless hatred of various 'others' (e.g. Germans, pork butchers and Protestants), but Muslims are the villains of the story, murderers of Michel's father and his mistress. While Michel's thoughts turn to domesticity and babies, young men with turbans – Muslim terrorists – blow Valérie and the hotel's prostitutes and their customers to bits. Whatever the merits of the book, which was originally published in French in 1999, the author is eerily prescient about how tourist resorts could become terrorism targets in Southeast Asia.

Houellebecq may be concerned with Thailand, which, although it has suffered attacks on nightclubs and centres of entertainment, has not experienced the same level of terrorist violence as other Southeast Asian countries, notably the Philippines. There the militant Islamic group Abu Sayyaf took 21 hostages, including 10 foreign tourists, from a diving resort in the Malaysia state of Sabah. The kidnap earned Abu Sayyaf US\$ 20 million, reportedly paid by Libya (Rabasa, 2003: 54).



Thailand, however, is arguably one of the most iconic of Southeast Asian tourism destinations and the fact that the real terrorist outrages have happened elsewhere does not detract from one of the main messages of the book: tourists are easily attacked and some of what they engage in may be used as a justification for attacking them. This chapter is mainly concerned with events in Bali, but because Bali itself is as iconic as Thailand and the attacks in Bali have involved cross-border movements of terrorists within ASEAN, the authors argue that the recent attacks on tourists are as much a Southeast Asian event as they are an Indonesian one. The bombings in Bali represent not only the largest act of terrorism in Indonesian history, but also one of the largest attacks on a tourist resort in the region.

Many analysts moreover link the attacks in Bali to attempts by terrorists to re-organize the modern borders of Southeast Asia to create a substantial Muslim Caliphate (Rabasa, 2003), a position steadfastly opposed by the governments of the region, including the country with the world's largest Muslim population, Indonesia. Terrorism networks with local agendas that converge with those of al-Qaeda have surfaced with the arrests in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia of militants associated with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and thus Southeast Asia has emerged as a major battleground in the war on terrorism, which has major implications for the region's important tourism industry.

Tourism and Terrorism

There is a widespread view among tourism analysts that international visitors are very concerned about their personal safety (Edgel, 1990:119) and that '(...) tourism can only thrive under peaceful conditions' (Pizam and Mansfield, 1996: 2). Political stability and prosperous tourism thus go hand in hand and, though tourism is perceived as being particularly vulnerable to international threats such as terrorism (Richter and Waugh, 1986: 238), analysts accept that it may be impossible to isolate tourists completely from the effects of international turbulence (Hall and O'Sullivan, 1996: 120). Security and peace may be crucial for tourism and international travel, but national and supranational organizations concerned with tourism have little influence on peace and security agendas (Hall, Timothy and Duval, 2003).

One of the most widely cited cases of the effect of international strife on leisure travel is that of the Gulf War in 1991. The downturn that accompanied the outbreak of hostilities had an impact not only on the area immediately surrounding the strife, but on international tourism generally. Indonesia, for example, was among those affected by the war, though it was located a great distance from the scene of conflict. Tourist arrivals in Indonesia tumbled in the first half of 1991 despite its designation as 'Visit Indonesia Year', part of an ASEAN-wide tourism promotion strategy (Hitchcock, King and Parnwell, 1993: 4). Once the country had recovered from this turbulence,

tourism continued to rise throughout the 1990s up until the fall of Suharto in 1998, helped in part by the security and stability provided by the military.

In view of tourism's sensitivity to crises, it is also widely held, particularly by tourism promotion boards, that the press has a particular role to play in helping alleviate the fears of travellers. In this respect the media is seen as being a major force in the creation of images of safety and political stability in destination regions (Hall and O'Sullivan, 1996: 107). Not only are obvious threats to tourism such as the press coverage of terrorism seen as a cause for alarm, but so is negative reporting in general. For example, following the onset of the Asian monetary crisis in 1997, Thailand became so alarmed about the future of its tourism industry in the wake of the poor publicity that it sought to counter the flood of bad news by the positive promotion of the country as a cost-effective destination (Higham, 2000: 133). Thailand's use of tourism simultaneously to boost its image and offset its budgetary deficit at a time of crisis is widely hailed as a success story, and the country has remained very sensitive about its image as a tourism destination.

Not all the strife that has a negative impact on tourism is concerned with tourism *per se*, though tourists have become targets to advance certain religious and political causes since the early 1990s at least, the most publicized case being that of Luxor in 1997 which left 58 foreign visitors dead. But even before Luxor terrorists were targeting tourists and, according to the Ministry of the Interior, had killed 13 of them, as well as 125 members of the Egyptian security forces, since 1991 (Aziz, 1995: 91). Five years were to elapse, however, until the first major loss of life of tourists from terrorism occurred in Southeast Asia, but when it did happen it was on a scale that overshadowed all previous attacks on tourists. As a result of the explosions of 2002 on the Indonesian island of Bali at least 201 people lost their lives, though the full extent of the casualties may never be known for sure because of the difficulties in identifying all the victims.

Ness has likened the attacks in Bali to a terrorist incident at Pearl Farm Beach on Samal Island in the Philippines, which she sets apart from more economically related incidents of tourism-related violence that have occurred in the Philippines and elsewhere. She also notes the 'family resemblance' of the Pearl Farm assault to the Marcos-era outbreak of arson attacks on luxury hotels in the 1980s by the politically-motivated Light-a-Fire Movement, as the activists came to be known (Ness, 2005: 119). This movement at times combined economic motives with political ones, as could well have been the case with the Pearl Farm attack, but the motives of the Light-a-Fire Movement were not only concerned with generating revenue for dissident groups. Ness makes the point that the Pearl Farm attack was more closely related to non-economically related forms of violence on tourism than with other forms, such as banditry (Ness, 2005). Ness characterizes the Pearl Farm attack as a form of locational violence directed against a particular kind of place and not a particular person or collection of individuals, but as this chapter argues the bombings in Bali were concerned as much with place as with certain kinds of people.

Because the trials of the Bali bombers were held in public and because professional journalists were able to interview the bombers it is possible to examine many of their motives with some clarity. The bombers initially claimed that they were attacking Americans, though the largest number of victims turned out to be Australians and the second largest, Indonesian. Despite this error what should also not be overlooked is that the American Consulate in Bali was also targeted that night. Placed around 100 metres from the American Consulate office, the bomb caused no casualties, but served as a warning to the United States that it was the target. As the casualty figures emerged a range of other political justifications were offered, such as an alleged statement by Osama bin Laden that it was indeed Australians who were being targeted because of their alliance with the United States. The motives may have been political but the outcome was also economic and Erawan (2003: 265) has argued that the bombings of 2002 had by far the biggest impact on Bali's economy of any recent crisis: in 2000 the tourism sector contributed 59.95 per cent of provincial GDP, but in 2002 it had fallen to 47.42 per cent.

The 2002 Bali Bombings

On 12 October 2002 three targets were bombed in the Indonesian island of Bali: the Sari nightclub and Paddy's Bar in Kuta and the American Consulate in Denpasar, not far from the former Australian Consulate office. The consulate bomb was largely ineffective, but the ones in Kuta were devastating. The bomb at Paddy's Bar did not at first appear to have had a great impact, but it had a deadly side effect. It drew people on to the streets so that when the next bomb at the nearby Sari Club went off more people were exposed. The explosives had been packed into a van that had been parked outside the packed nightclub, which was almost entirely destroyed by the blast and raging fire that ensued.

The victims represented twenty-two nations, but the brunt of the tragedy was borne by Australia with eighty-eight dead. The second largest loss of life with thirty-five dead was experienced by Indonesia, the majority of those who perished being Balinese islanders. What should also not be overlooked is that many of the Balinese dead were Muslims, drawn from a minority on the largely Hindu island of Bali. The third largest toll was suffered by the UK, which lost twenty-three of its citizens in the explosion. Not only are Americans (7) and many European countries (Germany, Sweden, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Poland) recorded in the list of victims, but also are Canada, South Africa and New Zealand. There were also other Asian victims (Taiwanese, Japanese and South Korean), as well as South Americans (Brazilians and an Ecuadorean) (see Table 4.1).

Initially, the Australian Federal Police said the attacks had been well planned and expertly conducted, and were intended to cause the maximum number of casualties. The police spokesman, Graham Ashton, maintained that the bombs were placed skillfully to make the best use of the surrounding buildings and that technical experts had

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evaluated the quality of bomb making as 'above average' (CNN, 1 November 2002). The investigators thought that the larger blast, which decimated the Sari Club, was caused by the explosive chlorate that had been ignited by a 'booster charge' such as TNT. Ashton also reported that 400 kilograms (880 pounds) of chlorate was stolen in September from a location on Java, but he declined to give more background information. Later in court it was revealed that one of the bombers, Amrozi, had purchased one ton of calcium chlorate (KClO₃) in a shop in East Java, which he shipped along with other chemicals to Bali by bus.

In response to the high death toll among Australians, the Australian Federal Police joined forces with the Indonesian investigators under the leadership of Inspector General

Table 4.1: Countries of Origin of the Victims of the 2002 Bali Bombings

Country	Number of Victims
Australia	88
Indonesia	35
UK	23
USA	7
Germany	6
Sweden	5
Switzerland	3
The Netherlands	4
France	4
Denmark	3
New Zealand	2
Brazil	2
Canada	2
South Africa	2
Japan	2
Korea	2
Italy	1
Portugal	1
Poland	1
Greece	1
Ecuador	1
Taiwan	1
Total	196
Plus 3 unidentified victims and 2 bombers	201

Source: Planning Bureau of Badung Regency, 2003.

I Made Mangku Pastika. In spite of the bombers' apparent ingeniousness a central part of their plan failed and this drew Pastika quite swiftly to the first of the suspects, Amrozi bin H. Nurhasyim. As a mechanic, Amrozi had intended to foil detection by altering the registration number on the van that he purchased to transport the larger bomb. What Amrozi was unaware of was that the van had previously been used as a minibus and carried another number, which Pastika's team were able to connect to Amrozi. After his arrest and interview with the Indonesian police chief, Da'i Bachtiar, Amrozi quickly gave the police a detailed confession, which laid the basis for the subsequent investigation.

The Australian and American governments initially suspected that the bombings were the work of an al-Qaeda-linked terror group based in Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), but no organization at that stage had claimed responsibility for the attacks in Bali. One of the chief suspects was JI's alleged leader, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who was detained on October 18 after Indonesian investigators returned from questioning an al-Qaeda operative, Omar Al-Faruq, who had been handed over to the United States in June earlier that year. Al-Faruq maintained that he knew Ba'asyir well and alleged that the cleric had been involved in attacks on Christian churches in Indonesia in late 2000. The security forces of the United States, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines also claimed to have evidence of JI's links to al-Qaeda and that the group had established several cells throughout Southeast Asia and Australia. It remains uncertain whether Ba'asyir was linked to the Bali bombings and according to a International Crisis Group report of December 2005 he is said to have opposed the bombings and was thus unlikely to have been the mastermind behind them (Rabasa, 2003: 35). The Indonesian police, however, believe that he was involved, but whatever the reality the fact is that Indonesia's Supreme Court overturned a guilty verdict against Ba'asyir for conspiracy with regard to the 2002 Bali bombings. He was released in June 2005 after completing a 30-month jail sentence (Murdoch, 2006).

Approximately a year later, the world's press was stunned when one of the alleged bombers, Mukhlas, reacted with delight when his death sentence was read out in the court in the island's capital of Denpasar. His response mimicked the ecstatic reactions of his brother Amrozi, nicknamed the 'smiling bomber' by the press, who had been sentenced earlier and who had claimed that there were many people in Indonesia willing to take his place should he die. Mukhlas was the third bomber, along with his younger brother and the operation's mastermind, Imam Samudra, to be sentenced to death for inspiring his followers to attack Westerners supposedly to avenge the oppression of Muslims.

A noteworthy feature about Mukhlas and his followers is that once charged they did not seek to deny that they had been the perpetrators, even to the extent of correcting the judges to make sure that the record was accurate. With the exception of Ali Imrom, who confessed that the bombings had been against his Muslim teachings, the bombers claimed to be proud of their achievements. Presumably to draw attention to their

religious motives, the alleged bombers donned Muslim-style clothes to attend court and were photographed carrying out their devotions. In contrast, Ali Imron wore a suit and tie in court, behaving politely and expressing remorse and even weeping a couple of times in public. Ali Imron also gave a press conference to describe how the bombs were made, demonstrating a filing cabinet similar to the one that was used in the bombings and other related equipment. He also rebutted claims that this was the work of foreign nationals and said that the bombers undoubtedly had the ability to make these explosive devices.

The Bombers' Motives

Seemingly satisfied with the number of foreigners killed, the bombers appeared to be unconcerned about the deaths of their own fellow citizens, many of whom were Muslims. Amrozi simply offered to pray for the dead Balinese, but the belief that he had done something worthwhile remained unshaken, expressing disappointment that he had not killed more Americans. As the trials took place many reporters claimed to be horrified by what they saw as the banal and callous behaviour of the bombers, and the *Asia Times* even likened them to Albert Eichmann and his complete lack of remorse about his crimes against Jewish people.

While exact parallels may not be drawn, broad similarities are appearing in the current Bali bombing trial. The cavalier, almost frivolous, attitude toward human lives is rooted in the banal worldview of the alleged Bali perpetrators.

(Asia Times, 3 June 2003)

In particular, Amrozi was quite open about what motivated him to conduct the attacks, claiming that he had learned about the decadent behaviour of white people in Kuta from Australians, notably from his boss while he was working in Malaysia. The Malaysian connection was important in another respect since he had worked alongside French and Australian expatriates in a quarry and had thus learned about explosives. Amrozi also maintained that it was these people who revealed to him what an easy target Bali was and he claimed to have become incensed about their stories of drug-taking and womanizing.

By 1996 Amrozi had convinced himself that it was the Jews who sponsored Westerners and that they were intent on controlling Indonesia. He began to hate Westerners and became convinced that violence was the only way to get these people out of Indonesia since diplomatic means had proved ineffectual. He revealed that the bombers comprised a core group of nine who were united in their hatred and were experienced in carrying out bombings. He claimed to have been involved in attacks in Jakarta, the Indonesian capital, and in the strife-torn regions of Ambon. He also maintained that he had participated in the Christmas Eve attack in 2000 in Mojokerto, Central Java, that claimed 19 victims, and admitted that he had had a hand in the attack on the Philippines Embassy in Jakarta and had actually mixed the explosives.

Kuta was selected as a location because there were a lot of foreigners there and when Amrozi heard that many of them had been killed he claimed to have felt very proud, though he prayed for the Muslim victims. Amrozi's hatred of Westerners may have been nurtured by his experiences in Malaysia, but he seems to have been open to other influences. For example, he attended the Lukman Nul Hakim *pesantren*, a traditional Islamic college, in the 1990s in Malaysia where Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was one of the teachers, but it remains unclear what he studied. Amrozi's hatred of Westerners could have been underpinned by radical Islamic teaching, but not all the bombers shared precisely the same outlook. Imam Samudra seems to have been more motivated by religious hatred and learned to manufacture bombs in Afghanistan. Also known by other aliases, Imam Samudra was trained as an engineer and had a university education.

The prosecutors in Denpasar alleged that Imam Samudra had selected the targets and organized the planning meetings and had remained in Bali for four days after the bombings supposedly to monitor the start of the police investigation. Imam Samudra was also suspected of being involved in a series of church bombings across Indonesia. On giving evidence at the separate trial of Abubakar Ba'asyir, Imam Samudra said that the bombings were part of a *jihad*, though he denied any connection with the militant group Jemaah Islamiyah. He responded to a question about the Christians who died in those attacks, by saying that 'Christians are not my brothers.' Imam Samudra is also the author of a 280-page book (2004), which he wrote in prison under the title *Aku Melawan Teroris* (I Oppose Terrorism). He cited the Koran in legitimizing his attacks and a *jihad* in Bali and reaffirmed that his target was the United States and its allies. According to his interpretation of his Holy Scripture, these enemies could be killed wherever they could be located. In his book, he refers to the Americans and their allies as 'nations of Dracula'. Searching at random, Imam Samudra discovered the the Sari Club and Paddy's Pub in Bali contained the largest homogeneous target of Americans and their allies (2004: 120). Referring to the large number of dead Indonesians, Imam Samudra wrote that it was 'human error' (English is in the original) and that he much regretted it (2004: 121).

The bombers may have responded differently to questions about their motives, but one who has offered a clear political explanation is Mukhlas. He was not only the eldest and most experienced of the three brothers, but was a veteran of Afghanistan where he claimed to have met Osama bin Laden.

Osama bin Laden. Yes, I was in the same cave as him for several months. At the time, he wasn't thinking about attacking America. It was Russia at that time.

(NineMSM, 23 May 2003)

In an interview recorded by Sarah Ferguson in prison nineteen months later, Mukhlas's reasoning was given in an English translation:

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I want the Australians to understand why I attacked them. It wasn't because of their faults, it was because of their leaders' faults. Don't blame me, blame your leader, who is on Bush's side. Why? Because in Islam, there is a law of revenge.

(NineMSN, 23 May 2003).

This could well be a post-event rationalization given the bombers' earlier claims that they were attacking Americans, but may represent their motives accurately

The bombers also justified themselves by arguing that they were taking part in a *jihad*, a struggle to establish the law of God on earth, which is usually interpreted as meaning holy war (www.parstimes.com/history/glossary.html). *Jihad* is sometimes called the 'sixth pillar of Islam', a reference to the famous 'five pillars' that underpin the identity of a Muslim. *Jihad* has two meanings, the first being the 'greater *jihad*', a struggle of any kind, particularly a moral one, such as striving to be a better person, a better Muslim, the struggle against drugs, against immorality, and against infidelity. The second interpretation is the holy war itself, which is embarked on when the faith is threatened in accordance with Islamic law, Shari'ah and only with the approval of the appropriate religious authority (faculty.juniata.edu/tuten/islamic/glossary.html). The bombers do not appear to have had the necessary authority to carry out their attacks and after careful consideration Ali Imron confessed in court (15 September 2003) that the bombers had broken the terms of *jihad* and contradicted Imam Samudra's position. His apprehension may be summarized as follows:

1. In accordance with the terms of *jihad* the target must be clear and there must be authentic proof that those targeted are truly the enemies of Islam, but in the case of the Bali bombings the targets were unclear.
2. Under the terms of *jihad* a warning or *dakwah* is required before any attack but in Bali the bombers attacked without warning.
3. The killing of women is excluded under the terms of *jihad* unless the women concerned have taken up arms against Islam, as was not the case in Bali.
4. In accordance with *jihad* any killing has to be done in the best possible (most humane) way, whereas bombings involved a very nasty form of killing.

Ali Imron went on to say that 'whatever the motive behind the Bali bombings, the act was wrong because it breached the rules'.

Discussion on the meaning of *jihad* was at the time of the first Bali bombings fairly limited in Indonesia, but this changed after the second round of bombings on 1 October 2005 when videos of the suicide bombers' confessions recorded before the attacks were circulated, compelling religious leaders to comment. The majority of religious leaders in Indonesia spoke against the practice of suicide bombings and argued that the instigation of *jihad* was only acceptable when the nation was under

attack. In contrast to what was happening in Iraq, they argued that *jihad* was not acceptable in Indonesia because there was no national threat.

Tourists as Targets

Since the bloody upheavals of the mid-1960s, Bali had been one of the safest islands in Indonesia, and remained untroubled by the violence that occurred during the Asian Crisis. Given the economic hardship that is widely experienced in the sprawling cities of neighbouring Java, it is perhaps not surprising that Bali's comparative security and prosperity may have encouraged a certain amount of envy. On top of this, many Balinese appear to have been unaware of potential threats from close at hand with many believing that theirs was a 'sacred island' that was protected by God from evil. This outlook seems to have been reinforced by an earlier experience of a failed bombing dating from the 1980s when a bomb from Java that was destined for Bali exploded on a bus before it reached the island. The rioting and bombing that took place elsewhere in Indonesia did not appear to be a problem in Bali and this may have led to complacency among the security services.

What also enhanced Bali's desirability as a target was its status as a renowned tourism destination with a truly global profile and thus any attack on it was likely to generate a high level of media interest, not least because of the presence of Western interests and Western tourists. The combination of its profile and prosperity may have made Bali a tempting target, but what seems to have made it compelling was that it was an easy target. This was compounded by the fact that other potential targets were becoming much harder to attack, especially in Jakarta. In response to the widespread strife that followed the fall of Suharto security measures were tightened to protect embassies and government institutions, making it more difficult to attack them. Tourist resorts and other visitor facilities in Bali were by comparison much easier to target and the tourists themselves, who were often present in large numbers, were difficult to protect without curtailing their freedom. They also had the advantage of following predictable behaviour patterns and a tendency to cluster.

Tourists are valuable in another way since there is often less of a local backlash when they are attacked because there are fewer innocent local victims – something that backfired in the case of the Bali bombings because of the high death rate among Indonesians. The presence of large numbers of Westerners moreover meant that any major disruption would attract foreign interest and thus publicize the terrorists' cause. The deaths of foreign nationals would not only attract attention, but would also generate external publicity that the government could not suppress. Interestingly, what has emerged from the trials in Denpasar is that tourists *per se* were not supposedly the intended victims, but Westerners and possibly Christians. These people were targeted

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because they were perceived as being associated with attacks on Muslims, and Amrozi made clear that he felt no remorse about killing them.

How can I feel sorry? I am very happy, because they attack Muslims and are inhumane.
(*Asia Times*, 3 June 2003)

The bombers anticipated that there would be more Americans in the club and bar, but when informed that the majority of their victims were Australians, one of them quipped:

Australians, Americans whatever – they are all white people.

This indifference to the victims may reflect the anger and rage about the alleged abuses of the West, but it also seems to be couched in terms that appear racist. The Indonesian words used to describe a person by their physical attributes can be ambiguous and can range from the culturally neutral '*orang putih*', literally 'white person', to the more controversial '*bule*', which means 'albino'. In Indonesian usage 'albino' can be used relatively neutrally and often crops up in humour, but when applied dismissively as in the quotation above it can convey notions of inferiority. When interviewing Amrozi on 23 May 2003, Sarah Ferguson recorded him making apparently dismissive comments about whites, but in the translation the word 'whities' was used and it remains unclear what was actually said in Indonesian. Significantly, the widely used term for tourist, *turis*, which is often used to refer to white people only, does not appear to have been used in these interviews, which suggests that it was the victims' Western or white attributes that caught the attention of the bombers.

The 2005 Bombings

The island was attacked for a second time on 1 October 2005 when cafés along Jimbaran Bay and Kuta were attacked, leaving 20 dead including three suicide bombers, most of whom were Indonesian citizens (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3). The first explosion was at Raja's Restaurant in Kuta Square at 7.45 pm local time and was followed a few minutes later by two bomb blasts at cafés along Jimbaran Bay, south of Bali's international airport. This time the bombers killed fewer people, but the bombs were more advanced and contained ball bearings, some of which were found in the bodies of injured victims.

It took the police less than two days to announce that the bombings were the work of not only terrorists, but also suicide bombers. The police reached this conclusion after receiving a video recording from an Australian tourist who, with his friend and family, happened to be outside Raja's Restaurant photographing the nightlife of Kuta. The Australian accidentally recorded a man with a backpack, who was walking faster than ordinary people, entering the restaurant seconds before the attack. At a press conference held in Kuta General I Made Pangku Pastika, the Bali police chief, showed journalists how a suicide bomber carrying a backpack could be seen walking through guests having dinner in the restaurant, which was followed seconds later by an explosion. The victims

Table 4.2: Countries of Origin of the Killed Victims of the 2005 Bali Bombings

Country	Number of Dead Victims
Japan	1
Australia	4
Indonesia (including 3 suicide bombers)	15
Total	20

Source: Indictment against Mohamad Cholily (a suspect of Bali Bombings II), prepared by Bali Prosecutor Officer, 2006, 8.

were identified relatively quickly and the police took away the remains of the three chief suspects whose body parts and heads had been found on the sites. By circulating a poster with pictures of the three suicide bombers in colour the police hoped that they would be able to identify the bombers, but it did not work out like that. Several weeks passed and because little progress was made with regard to identifying the bombers their pictures were revised and clarified by removing the blood and debris from their faces. The police distributed more posters, but once again the public response was minimal. Since no family members or friends came forward to admit that they knew the bombers, the Indonesian public in general and the tourism industry in particular started to become very worried. It began to occur to the police that perhaps Indonesian citizens were simply unable, as opposed to unwilling, to identify the bombers, and this time there appeared to be signs of foreign involvement. The police and media opined that the bombs were the work of two Malaysian fugitives from the Bali bombings of 2002, Azahari and Noordin M. Top and that a new generation of bombers was involved.

Perhaps because of fears of a more global dimension to the attacks the 2005 Bali bombings enquiry was more secretive than the investigation of the bombings of 2002, which was rather open to the media. The police held daily and frequent press conferences, but the public received no significant information on those responsible for the latest round of bombings. The police only stated that there were no significant developments, and that they were continuing to question witnesses, whose number rose above 700. Alongside these enquiries, the police launched silent operations shaking out alleged Jemaah Islamiyah suspects throughout Java, although no arrests were announced until after the storming of Azahari's safe house in Batu in Malang, East Java. Azahari and one of his followers were killed during the raid and the police found dozens of vest-bombs, VCDs, books and a plan for a 'bomb party' for Christmas and New Year. Noordin remained on the run and as of mid-2006 had still not been apprehended.

According to the International Crisis Group South East Asia Project Director, Sidney Jones, Noordin Top now called his splinter group 'al-Qa'ida for the Malay

Table 4.3: Countries of Origin of the Injured Victims of the 2005 Bali Bombings

Country	Number of Injured
Indonesia	102
Korea	7
Japan	4
America	4
Germany	3
Belgium	1
France	1
Australia	29
Total	151

Source: Indictment against Mohamad Cholily (a suspect of Bali Bombings II), prepared by Bali Prosecutor Officer, 2006, 8.

archipelago', although he still regarded himself as the leader of JI's military wing. According to Jones, Noordin and the people around him adhered to the al-Qaeda tactic of attacking the United States and its allies and, being close to Indonesia, Australia was a prime target (Radio Australia, *AM*, 6 May 2006). The funding to mount attacks could have come from various sources, including al-Qaeda, as well as from the group's own activities. For example, prior to the Bali bombings of 2002, some of Imam Samudra's men robbed a gold shop in West Java and the proceeds helped to defray the expense of the attack. These costs included an estimated Rp 3–4 million to make a vest bomb, the rental of premises and the costs of surveying the target.

The details of the 1 October 2005 attacks were found in notes found at the scenes of the bombings and in the hiding places of those taken into custody. The notes reveal how JI members travelled to Bali to survey potential targets before reporting back to JI's master bomb-maker Azahari. They surveyed nightclubs, temples, shopping areas, sports venues, fast food outlets, souvenir shops and the airport. They concluded that Jimbaran Bay, the eventual scene of two attacks, was a good target because, 'Insyah Allah' (God Willing), they estimated that there would be at least 300 people there (Wockner, 2006a). One of the four suspects of the 2005 attack, Mohamad Cholily, said he was with Dr Azahari when they heard news of the bombings on BBC Radio. He claimed that Azahari had shouted 'Allahu Akbar' (God is Greatest) and 'Our project was a success'. Cholily, who was learning bomb-making skills from 'the demolition man' Azahari, was arrested one month later. It was Cholily who led police to the safe house in East Java where the famous fugitive was hiding (Wockner, 2006b).

Azahari was killed in the raid but this did not alleviate the public's fears a great deal, largely because of the existence of the plan for the 'bomb party'. Even though

the police confiscated numerous vest bombs, it was widely believed that Azahari must already have recruited dozens of people who were prepared to conduct suicide missions. Anxieties were also heightened by the video footage recovered in the operation because they contained the pre-recorded confessions of the three suicide bombers who attacked Bali: Salik Firdaus, Aip Hidayatullah, and Misno.

Widely circulated in the media, both in Indonesia and abroad, the confessions sent out the horrifying message that further attacks were possible. The Australian government responded by issuing additional travel warnings, leading to a decline in visitor arrivals, but there were important differences as compared with the 2002 attacks. For example, the massive exodus of tourists that had followed the 2002 bombings did not recur and it looked at first as if the tourism industry would not be so adversely affected. Eventually the numbers began to drop drastically due to the combination of the travel warnings and the televised confessions of the suicide bombers. Terrorism in its global context also appears to have exerted an influence as Indonesians were shocked by coverage of a female Iraqi suicide bomber who succeeded in bombing a wedding party in Amman. An Indonesian musician was included among her victims.

There was ongoing coverage in the Asian and Australian media of terrorist attacks and the hunt for terrorists and this undoubtedly helped frighten visitors away. Australia also continued to issue travel warnings about the possibility of further terrorist attacks in Indonesia, which was understandable given the fact that Noordin was still at large. On 29 April 2006, in a dawn raid at Wonosobo, Central Java, the police killed two suspected terrorists and arrested another two, but Noordin evaded capture. There was now speculation that this terrorist mastermind had either run out of followers or had a reduced capacity to launch further attacks.

The Christmas and New Year period is usually the busiest time of the year in Bali but the combination of the 2005 bombings and perceptions of a global terror threat began to have a severe impact on arrivals in Indonesia, and hotel occupancy in Bali fell below 40 per cent. Occupancy declined to 30 per cent in 2006 and what had been expected to represent a full recovery from 2002 had turned into a huge downturn. By 24 November Air Paradise International (API), the Bali-based and -owned airline, had mothballed its service totally and was forced to lay off 350 of its employees, some of whom were Australian employees. Garuda Indonesia reduced its flight frequency from 32 to 25 services per week between Bali/Indonesia and various cities in Australia, and their services between Bali and Japan dropped from 22 to 16 a week. Deprived of customers, many local tour agencies experienced hardship. The drop in passenger demand came from Bali's two main sources of tourists: Australia and Japan. Overall arrival figures dropped by almost 50 per cent, from around 4,500 per day to 2,000 per day in the months after the 2005 bombings and as a consequence Qantas and Australian Airlines also reduced the frequency of their flights to Bali. The decline

was possibly as bad if not greater than that of 2002 (*Kompas*, 11 January 2006: 35). The attacks may have been directed at America and its allies, but in the process great suffering was inflicted on Indonesian people and the Indonesian economy.

Conclusion

The 2002 bombers offered different variations of the main reasons for their attacks ranging from a simple desire to hit back at Westerners for their supposed attacks on Muslims to a more politically sophisticated attack on John Howard's support for President Bush and Australian intervention in East Timor in 1999. Some of their explanations have been couched in terms of what appears to be racial hatred, though these threats and statements are somewhat vague. What is clear is that they decided to bomb a tourist resort because it offered a relatively soft target, but not because the victims were tourists per se, but because their numbers were likely to include large numbers of foreigners whose deaths would attract publicity to the terrorists' cause. Some disapproval over the alleged behaviour of tourists in Indonesia has been expressed, but it was the intended victims' nationality and perhaps racial type, their invaluable foreign-ness, that appears to have been upper-most in the bombers' minds. Tourists are also useful because they create more publicity than when only locals are involved. Such publicity is moreover difficult to suppress, thereby enabling terrorists to make their various causes known more widely. The tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004 seems to reinforce the notion that foreign tourists make for more media attention than say the terrible disaster in Darfur or previous disasters in China involving only nationals.

Despite the caveats, tourists were the main targets, perhaps not because they were tourists, but because their behaviour is predictable and they have a tendency to cluster. Their value is enhanced since ordinarily there is less backlash to attacking tourists than to indiscriminate bombing, which produces more 'innocent victims'. Bali seems to have been doubly attractive because any local victims would be likely to be Hindu and not Muslim. As it happened, the bombers miscalculated and ended up killing significant numbers of their co-religionists.

After the 2005 Bali attack police found a document called the 'Bali Project', which contained the reasons for targeting. The document began with the question 'Why Bali?' to which the answer was: 'Because it is the attack that will have global impact. Bali is famous all over the world, even more famous than Indonesia. The attack in Bali will be covered by international media and the world will get the message that the attack is dedicated to America and its allies' (Wockner, 2006b). This turned out to be an accurate prediction since media worldwide covered the Bali attacks immediately.

The impact of the Bali bombings of 2005 on the island's tourism sector seems to be far worse than that of 2002. After the 2002 bombings, multinational investi-

gations and support from the international community helped to speed up the investigation and restore Bali's image as a safe destination. Tourism arrivals recovered quite quickly once the island seemed secure again. But after the 2005 bombing less help from the international community was evident due to a combination of factors: compassion fatigue in the aftermath of the tsunami, especially with Australia, which had contributed generously, and a general stretching of resources in a generally less safe environment. Possibly because the 2005 attacks had a limited direct effect on Australians, less help with police work was offered to Indonesia; a wide range of considerations, including the identity of the victims, would appear to complicate the recovery of tourism from a terrorist attack.

The common feature of both the attack in Thailand imaged by Houellebecq and the real attacks in Bali is that they occurred in mass tourism resorts and that terrorists exploited the opportunities that this kind of tourism provides: relatively easy targets, large numbers of potential victims, relatively small numbers of co-religionists, the publicity value of foreigners and the alleged hedonism of tourists that could be exploited rhetorically as a justification for killing them. What would be worth investigating is whether other kinds of tourism such as cultural tourism or eco-tourism, which are often hard to disaggregate precisely from mainstream tourism, are less vulnerable to such attacks and thus politically and economically more sustainable.

Authors' Note

The authors are especially grateful to the following institutions and organisations: Udayana University, Bali–HESG, the British Academy, ASEAN–EU University Network Programme, and London Metropolitan University. We are indebted to the Sutasoma Trust for supporting I Nyoman Darma Putra as the first Bagus Suatasoma Fellow. Thanks are also due to the late Prof Dr I Gusti Ngurah Bagus and Prof Ida Bagus Adnyana Manuaba of Udayana University for their generous support. The first version of this paper was presented at the International Sociology Congress Hawaii in 2005 and the authors are grateful to Linda Richter and her fellow panellists for their comments. A later version was presented at the South-East Asia seminar series in 2005 at St Antony's Asian Studies Centre, University of Oxford, and the authors are also very grateful for their comments.