



Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Muslim World in the Changing Global Environment

Indonesia's foreign policy has always to be consistent with *Pancasila* and the preamble to the 1945 Constitution.¹

The state will never monopolize the religious life of Indonesian society, and no religions can monopolize the government's policies and activities either.²

The roots, nature and evolution of Indonesian foreign policy

In principle, Indonesia has followed a *Bebas-Aktif* (independent and active) foreign policy since the seminal speech on the basic principles of Indonesia's foreign policy by Vice President Mohammad Hatta in September 1948.³ In the history of Indonesia's international relations, this basic principle has served as the 'unchallengeable doctrinal basis of foreign policy'.⁴

This chapter examines the roots, nature and evolution of the '*Bebas-Aktif*' principle that has produced continuity and discontinuity in Indonesia's foreign policy. It also discusses the place of Islam in Indonesian politics and the development of the Muslim world as the internal and external environment of Indonesian foreign policy.

The *Bebas-Aktif* foreign policy under Sukarno

Like that of any other country, Indonesia's foreign policy is derived from the country's unique cultural values, historical experiences, aspirations of

its society and its strategic position in world politics – in other words, ‘a cluster of orientations.’⁵ Historically, the main roots of *Bebas-Aktif* as the basic principle of Indonesia’s foreign policy can be found in the first and fourth paragraphs of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution in which Indonesia committed itself to abolish colonialism and create a world order based on independence, peace and social justice. Further, the fourth paragraph states that Indonesia was obliged to take an active role in achieving world order based upon freedom, eternal peace and social justice. Even though the 1945 Constitution did not explicitly elaborate on the specific nature and characteristic of Indonesia’s foreign policy, it represents the core values of Indonesia’s foreign policy, such as to safeguard national independence, sovereignty and security; maintain internal consolidation; and safeguard economic interests.⁶

As a post-colonial state, Indonesia showed a strong anti-colonialist commitment based upon its experiences in achieving and maintaining national independence. In addition, the world situation after World War II with the rise of a bipolar international system demanded that Indonesia should ‘play no favorites between the two opposed blocs and [follow] its own path through the various international problems.’⁷ In his famous speech of 1948, Mohammad Hatta stated:

Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course of action open to them than to choose between being pro-Russian or pro-American? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of our national ideals? The Indonesian government is of the opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a passive party in the arena of international politics but that it should be an active agent entitled to decide its own standpoint. ... The policy of the Republic of Indonesia must be resolved in the light of its own interests and should be executed in consonance with the situations and facts it has to face. ... The lines of Indonesia’s policy cannot be determined by the bent of the policy of some other country which has its own interests to service.⁸

With the above formulation, Indonesia’s government wanted to show its position both to the international system and to its domestic environment. Internationally, it demonstrated its attitude and stance in world politics by choosing to remain non-aligned in the Cold War rivalry

between the two superpowers, the USA and USSR. This position prevented Indonesia earning the enmity of either party, preserved national interests, and permitted Indonesia to build amity with all nations on a basis of mutual respect.⁹ It also demonstrated that the *Bebas-Aktif* foreign policy, as Rizal Sukma notes, was more dictated by the reality of world politics and its possible impact on domestic politics than by religious concerns.¹⁰ Domestically, the policy was intended to help minimize the ideological rivalry among the competing political elites, particularly between 'secular nationalism' and 'religious nationalism.'¹¹ The basic components of Indonesia's foreign policy, anti-colonialism and nationalism, in essence show the domination of secular-nationalists over the religious-nationalists in managing Indonesia's foreign relations.

The international and domestic contexts within which the Indonesian government had to put the *Bebas-Aktif* principle into effect, though, were rarely static. Thus different governments/regimes have adopted different interpretations of the principle.

In the early period of the *Bebas-Aktif* foreign policy, 1948–50, Indonesia faced the challenge of maintaining its national independence and consolidating its status in world politics. As Anak Agung explains, during the revolution two crucial objectives of Indonesia's foreign policy were defending Indonesia's freedom against the Dutch and seeking international recognition of Indonesia's independence as declared by Sukarno and Hatta. A combination of *diplomasi* (diplomacy) and *perjuangan* (struggle) were seen as the best means to accomplish these goals.¹² More practically, Indonesia tried not to ally itself with either bloc by establishing diplomatic relations with both of the two superpowers.¹³

The implementation of the *Bebas-Aktif* policy changed when the Sukiman cabinet, a strong anti-communist cabinet installed in 1951 and dominated by the Masyumi (modernist-dominated Islamic Party), signed the Mutual Security Act with the United States in 1952 in order to gain economic aid. This agreement was perceived by some Indonesian political leaders as violating and betraying the *Bebas-Aktif* policy. The signing of the agreement led to a split in Masyumi. One Masyumi leader, Mohammad Natsir, condemned the agreement for being 'clear evidence of deviation from [an] independent foreign policy'¹⁴ and forced the Sukiman cabinet to resign. One crucial lesson that could be learnt from this resignation was, as Anak Agung notes, that 'any administration that challenged the traditional

foundation of the foreign policy of the republic and deviated from it could not stay in power'.¹⁵ This was the only occasion in independent Indonesia's history when a cabinet fell over foreign policy issues.

Sukiman was succeeded as prime minister by Wilopo, who was followed by Ali Sastroamidjojo in July 1953. As the new prime minister, Ali put a different emphasis on the implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy by broadening the definition of the *Bebas-Aktif* principle.¹⁶ In contrast to the policy of previous cabinets, Ali established a more balanced relationship with the communist and non-communist states. This policy was congruent with the objective of the *Bebas-Aktif* policy that Indonesia would establish mutual cooperation and friendship with every country in order to preserve international peace. As a consequence of this policy, Indonesia established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1954. This was followed by the opening of diplomatic relations with several other communist countries.

The other feature of Ali's foreign policy was the initiative to host the historic Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955 which produced the Bandung Principles. These principles emphasized peaceful co-existence, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states and promoted Afro-Asian solidarity. Ali's cabinet was also the first to campaign for the internationalization of the West Irian dispute with the Dutch at the UN General Assembly. By organizing the conference, Indonesia hoped to get support of the Afro-Asian countries for its claim on West Irian.¹⁷ This conference also marked a closer relationship between Indonesia and the People's Republic of China when they signed an agreement on 'dual citizenship'¹⁸. All in all, Ali's initiative to broaden the implementation of the *Bebas-Aktif* foreign policy ensured that Indonesia would play an active role on the international stage as well as having 'reasonably balanced relations' in world politics.

Indonesia's *Bebas-Aktif* foreign policy was radically changed during the Guided Democracy period, which began on 5 July 1959 when Sukarno signed a decree that enabled him to abandon the provisional constitution of 1950 and re-adopt the 1945 Constitution. This decree marked the end of the Liberal Democracy period, and gave him greater power to run the country.

During the Guided Democracy period, the three major actors in Indonesian politics were Sukarno, the Indonesian Communist Party

(PKI) and the military. This triangle of forces gave Sukarno a central role in domestic and international issues that he had lacked under the parliamentary system. Sukarno believed that the radicalization of foreign policy and coercive diplomacy could serve Indonesia's national interests, which he saw as being aimed to 'sustain national unity and establish a just and prosperous society'.¹⁹

In order to pursue these national goals, Sukarno brought three different ideologies (nationalism, religion, and communism) into the foreign policy domain. The first ideology led to a radical policy in which he identified international imperialism, colonialism and capitalism as Indonesia's main enemies and declared Indonesia's struggle against them should continue.²⁰ The second ideology was concerned with the role of religion in Indonesia's political process. The third ideology was linked to diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China.²¹ However, although foreign policy can be regarded as a reflection of domestic politics, 'no evidence of Islamic influence was manifested in foreign policy'.²²

To implement the above policy, Sukarno used two important aspects of Indonesia's diplomacy: conventional diplomacy and diplomacy as an instrument of revolution. These two aspects complemented each other as well as giving content to each other.²³ With these kinds of diplomacy, Sukarno began to radicalize Indonesia's foreign policy with the aim of liberating West Irian.²⁴ The question of West Irian, as Leifer points out, was not only perceived as the fundamental symbol of national unity but also a matter of personal prestige for Sukarno.²⁵

Soon after the inclusion of West Irian (subsequently known as Irian Jaya) as an Indonesian province in 1962, Sukarno proposed the idea of NEFOS (New Emerging Forces) as an 'international united front'²⁶ to reject the power of the neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism of the West. With this idea, he divided the world into two major groups, namely OLDEFOS (Old Emerging Forces), comprising the Western or imperialist forces, and NEFOS, which consisted of Communist forces and the new states of Asia and Africa. The idea of NEFOS was an example of Sukarno's use of external actions to divert public attention from growing domestic divisions and economic problems within Indonesia. It was also, in part, designed by Sukarno to instill national pride.

Indonesia's foreign policy took a more radical and militant form when Sukarno reacted to the establishment of the Federation of Malay-

sia in 1963 by declaring the campaign of *Konfrontasi* (confrontation) to 'crush Malaysia'. Sukarno believed that the formation of Malaysia represented the colonialist powers' attempt to maintain their domination of the newly emerging states, particularly Asian countries.²⁷

In the period of the Guided Democracy, Indonesia's foreign policy became 'Sukarno's personal domain'.²⁸ Sukarno exercised a prerogative role here and considered Indonesia to be a world leader. This strong perception became clearer when Indonesia withdrew from the UN in 1965 and proposed the creation of the Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) to replace the UN system. Asian communist states such as North Korea and the People's Republic of China (PRC) strongly supported this idea and even assisted in establishing its headquarters in Beijing. This strong solidarity among communist states and Indonesia led to the formation of the Jakarta–Phnom Penh–Hanoi–Pyongyang–Beijing axis.

Domestically, the close relationship between Indonesia and the communist states, particularly with the PRC, increased the PKI's power.²⁹ Meanwhile, Sukarno's radical and militant foreign policy did not bring a crucial improvement to the Indonesian economy. On the contrary, this policy led to the deterioration of national resources. Politically, there was also a strong rejection by the military of the concept of NASAKOM (Nationalisme, Agama dan Komunisme or Nationalism, Religion and Communism). This led to the coup in 1965 that marked the end of Guided Democracy and thence to the emergence of military rule under the leadership of General Soeharto.

Under Sukarno, Indonesia's foreign policy was conducted with a very high profile. This was mainly due to Sukarno's need for Indonesia to have an international stature in world politics. Furthermore, the strategies that Sukarno implemented to achieve international status were also quite radical, challenging the West and making an alliance with the communist countries.

The New Order era and 'true' *Bebas-Aktif* foreign policy

Indonesia entered a new era following the fall of Sukarno in 1965. In this new era, known as *Orde Baru* (New Order), the country was led by General Soeharto. The essential characteristic of the New Order was that the military became the most important actor/decision-maker in both the domestic and foreign policy of Indonesia. Warshawsky even suggests that

the military was 'the only truly national institution capable of assuming authority in the post-coup era.'³⁰ Another characteristic of the New Order was that the grip of the state over society became much tighter than during the Guided Democracy era.³¹

Nonetheless, as under the Old Order, the New Order administration applied the same ideological foundation of *Pancasila* (the five principles originally formulated by Sukarno in 1945)³² and same constitutional structure of the 1945 Constitution to its politics. The New Order introduced the idea of 'purifying of the implementation' of *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution in national political life.³³ The New Order perceived that, during the Sukarno era, Indonesia had deviated from *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. Moreover, the New Order was strongly anti-communist, had a commitment to economic development and political stability and had a pragmatic international outlook.³⁴ These three crucial aspects were applied to achieve and protect national interests both domestically and internationally.

Under the leadership of General Soeharto, Indonesia's foreign policy was adjusted to the new circumstances of domestic and external environment in three ways.³⁵ First, the conduct of foreign policy was based on the internal strength produced by the adoption of *pembangunan ekonomi* (economic development) as a dominant theme of Soeharto's regime. Second, Soeharto also pursued the creation of *stabilitas nasional* (national stability) as a pivotal prerequisite for economic development. Internal stability could only be achieved through recognizing the dominant position of the military in politics. In turn, the New Order regime believed that economic development and internal stability could only be achieved by pursuing a totally different style and initiative in foreign policy. These two core political values (economic development and political stability), then, served as the basis of the legitimacy of the New Order in managing both domestic politics and Indonesia's foreign relations.³⁶

But Soeharto's main focus, at least initially, was on domestic politics not foreign policy. He aimed at restoring national economic prosperity as the primary national political priority. In 1967, the New Order regime released its *Undang-Undang Penanaman Modal Asing* or Law regarding Foreign Investment as a tool of economic foreign policy to invite foreign aid and investment.³⁷ However, a low-profile foreign policy downplayed Indonesia's role on the international stage.

Secondly, Indonesia's foreign policy under Soeharto also began to move closer to Western countries. Soeharto introduced an open-door policy in order to invite foreign aid and investment, particularly from the Western countries to rehabilitate the national economy.

As the third aspect of the 'new' foreign policy strategies, Soeharto ended the confrontation with Malaysia. This was the first major foreign policy initiative of the New Order administration. It indicated a substantial change in Indonesia's foreign policy and showed a new commitment to a good-neighbour policy and the importance of strong regional ties in its foreign policy.

Soeharto went even further by paying special attention to the interests of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia.³⁸ With a series of diplomatic actions led by the foreign minister, Adam Malik, the chief architect of Indonesia's New Order foreign policy, ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok. The establishment of ASEAN was a manifestation of the *Bebas-Aktif* principle, which emphasized the importance of a good-neighbour policy in the region.

This regional group comprised five Southeast Asian nations: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. As Anwar explains, the major aim of the creation of this association was to 'help create an environment conducive to Indonesia's domestic political stability and economic development by removing possible sources of conflicts and distractions.'³⁹ This was due to Indonesia's concerns about 'the spillover of domestic tensions in the region',⁴⁰ which could have a politico-security impact on other states in the region. The New Order was quite concerned with the instability of many of the states in the region. Hostilities continued in Vietnam and Cambodia while guerrilla movements of varying strengths operated in the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Laos and Malaysia.

More importantly, as pointed out by Leifer, with the establishment of ASEAN the Southeast Asian countries could find a common mechanism to manage regional stability. Indonesia stressed regional economic and social cooperation to improve the internal structure of the various states so as to help them eliminate the root causes of these disturbances to the region as a whole. Thus, ASEAN became the most important of the 'concentric circles in Indonesia's foreign policy.'⁴¹

The next priority of Soeharto's foreign policy was to restore Indonesia's relations with the US⁴² and Japan.⁴³ During the Sukarno era, Indonesia's relations with the US were tense because of its close relations with the USSR while Indonesia had only a limited interaction with Japan. Closer and better relationships with these two countries could help Indonesia to pursue its domestic goals of negotiating the rescheduling of Indonesia's foreign debt repayment, attracting foreign investment for national development and restoring and stabilizing national economic conditions⁴⁴.

In order to achieve these goals, Indonesia implemented the so-called 'diplomacy of development'.⁴⁵ This diplomacy coloured the style of Indonesia's foreign policy under the New Order. An early success of this diplomacy was the creation of the International Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) in Amsterdam in 1967. The IGGI was 'the medium through which foreign aid was dispensed for Indonesia's economic recovery and development'.⁴⁶ This group also acted as 'a watchdog to monitor the progress of economic performance and to advise an appropriate response in terms of aid'.⁴⁷ From 1967 to 2000, the IGGI (now CGI or Consultative Group on Indonesia) has given foreign aid to the amount of US \$100.5 billion.⁴⁸

As the central figure in Indonesia's foreign policy, Soeharto took a more cautious but more assertive view than Sukarno. With respect to the *Bebas-Aktif* principle, a few years after the creation of ASEAN, Indonesia took part in the international action to condemn Israel for the burning of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. This event then led to the crystallization of Islamic solidarity, which resulted in the establishment of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Rabat, Morocco, in 1970. Indonesia, as the largest Muslim country in the World, showed its commitment to the fostering of the international Muslim brotherhood (*Ukhuwah Islamiyah*) but seemed to conduct a cautious policy on the establishment of the OIC by not sending a delegation to the first and second meetings of the OIC.⁴⁹ This was because 'sending a delegation to the first and second conferences of the OIC would have jeopardized Indonesia's relations with the Western world'.⁵⁰

Indonesia did send a delegation led by foreign minister Adam Malik to the third Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Jeddah in March 1972, the aim being to promote international cooperation between Indonesia and the Islamic states based on the *Bebas-Aktif* principle, *Pancasila*, the

1945 Constitution and the UN Charter. It did not base its participation on Islamic principles. Indonesia declined to sign the OIC Charter and thus became a full member of the organization because the OIC Charter stated that membership was open to 'every Muslim State',⁵¹ Indonesia declaring that it was not an Islamic state. This position made Indonesia a unique participant in the OIC.⁵² It also showed that Islam had been contained as a basic principle in determining Indonesia's foreign policy.

Soeharto's obsession with avoiding the possibility of the threat of communism in Indonesia pushed him and the military to invade East Timor in 1975. In the following year, East Timor was declared the 27th province of Indonesia. But the problem was not yet over as Fretilin guerrillas continued to fight for East Timorese independence. More importantly, on the international front, East Timor became the most pressing issue in Indonesia's diplomacy.

With the rapid changing of Indonesia's domestic (political stability and economic boom) and international environment (détente between US and USSR) in 1970s and early 1980s, Indonesia's foreign policy became more assertive.⁵³ Several international issues demonstrated this increased assertiveness. The first indication was Indonesia's proposal for the 'cocktail party' and Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) as political mechanisms in helping to solve the Cambodian problem. Another example was Indonesia's willingness to play a leadership role in the Third World. As the host of the Asian-African Congress in Bandung in 1955, which produced *Dasa Sila Bandung* (the ten Bandung principles) as the basic principle of the relationships among non-aligned countries, Indonesia set the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as one of its essential foreign policy priorities. Indonesia's growing interest in the development of the NAM can be seen from two important measures.

In April 1985, Indonesia hosted the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung. Even though this event could not issue important recommendations for the future development of Asian and African countries, by hosting this commemoration Indonesia showed its strong commitment to global issues, particularly the issue of the North-South dialogue in the international arena.

Second, and more importantly, Indonesia showed its willingness to claim the leadership of the Third World countries by applying for the chairmanship of the NAM.⁵⁴ Its first application in 1987 was defeated largely

due to the perception of some NAM leaders of Indonesia's close relations with the Western World (especially the US) and more importantly the issue of East Timor. Indonesia was finally elected as NAM chairman for 1992–95 after the NAM Ministerial meeting at Accra in September 1991. This position implied that, even though the Cold War era had ended, the NAM in Indonesia's view was still relevant as a political force to increase the socio-economic capability of Third World countries and to enhance the efforts of the establishment of

a new international order and international relations based on freedom, eternal peace, justice and common prosperity through friendship and international cooperation without differentiating ideology, political system and economic system.⁵⁵

Indonesia emphasized the issue of economic development as the main agenda of the NAM and encouraged an increase in the intensity of North–South dialogue as well as in South–South dialogue as the main keys of diplomacy of development of the NAM.⁵⁶

The chairmanship of the NAM also gave Indonesia the opportunity to conduct what Soeharto saw as the 'ideal way' of the '*Bebas-Aktif*' foreign policy. This was indicated by several crucial steps such as Indonesia's 'non-alignment' policy with respect to the conflict in Bosnia.⁵⁷ Another step in the conduct of the '*Bebas-Aktif*' foreign policy was President Soeharto's meeting with Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Jakarta in 1994.⁵⁸ The meeting was held as the continuation of a peace agreement between Israel and the PLO. Considering that there were no diplomatic relations between Israel and Indonesia and there was a possibility of rejection of the meeting by Indonesia's Muslim community, Suharto met Yitzhak Rabin not as President of Indonesia but in his capacity as NAM chairman. As Djiwandono explains, 'without his capacity as NAM Chairman, it would have been impossible for President Soeharto to receive PM Rabin in the present situation.'⁵⁹

With this visit, President Soeharto wanted to show NAM member countries that the 'NAM will be able to play a positive and constructive role for world peace if it can avoid a confrontation policy'⁶⁰ and, more importantly, the concrete examples of the implementation of the true '*Bebas-Aktif*' foreign policy.⁶¹ In addition, President Soeharto appointed NAM special envoys and a special advisor to the foreign minister. He also

installed several Indonesian economic experts as a special team as part of his domestic political appointments to help overcome debt problems of NAM countries.⁶²

The effort to 'redefine' the implementation of the *Bebas-Aktif* foreign policy reached its peak when Indonesia decided to normalize its bilateral relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in August 1990. These had been frozen for 25 years because allegedly the PRC had backed the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965. Despite some objections, Soeharto recognized that the PRC was one of the important major powers in Asia Pacific with whom Indonesia needed a diplomatic relationship.⁶³ He believed that new diplomatic relations with PRC would bring some positive effects at both bilateral and regional levels in the post-Cold War era. For Indonesia, it was quite obvious that normalization of relations with the PRC would enable the creation of a new positive pattern of relationships in the Asia Pacific region that could encourage the process of political-security arrangements in the post-Cold War era.⁶⁴

Another crucial example of the implementation of a purified *Bebas-Aktif* policy was Indonesia's decision to dissolve the IGGI when Jan Pronk, the Chairman of the IGGI, criticized Indonesia's domestic policy in handling the Dili tragedy in November 1991.⁶⁵ This decision clearly indicated that, even though economic development was the highest priority of Indonesia's foreign policy, it did not necessarily mean that any country could interfere in matters Indonesia regarded as internal.

As the continuation of a more assertive foreign policy, Indonesia also showed its strong commitment to the development of the Asia Pacific region. In politico-security terms, Indonesia endorsed the idea of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a multilateral security arrangement that would enhance the level of mutual reassurance among the countries in the region, particularly with the major powers. In economic terms, Indonesia's commitment at the regional level was indicated by hosting the second APEC meeting at Bogor in November 1994. In fact, many analysts believed that Indonesia's commitment to the idea of an Asia Pacific free trade area was not driven by economic factors but by Indonesia's desire to be recognized as an important international leader, particularly in the Asia Pacific region.⁶⁶

The above description suggests that Indonesia's foreign policy under Soeharto showed different characteristics to that of the Sukarno era.

These differences were mainly in terms of the ways in which the *Bebas-Aktif* foreign policy was interpreted.

The implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy under the New Order was not without criticism. One of the areas in which Indonesia met criticism in its foreign relations was on the issue of East Timor. However, given the domestic and international political situation, it was likely that Indonesia's policy on this issue would become a major catastrophe. Another criticism of the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy was Indonesia's conclusion of the 'Agreement on Maintaining Security' with Australia in December 1995. Aisyah Amini, a member of parliament from the PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or United Development Party), for instance, argued that this agreement was a denial of the '*Bebas-Aktif*' principle.

Sukma argues that, in conducting its foreign policy, Indonesia was intent on 'keeping all options open'⁶⁷ so that it could define the meaning of *Bebas-Aktif* in very loose terms. In other words, as Sukma explains, Indonesia's foreign policy under Soeharto was conducted in 'a broader, more flexible and more pragmatic' manner than under his predecessor, Sukarno.⁶⁸ More importantly, the *Bebas-Aktif* policy was always defined without the inclusion of religious sentiments.

Islam and the New Order's politics

The New Order and the Islamic community: A fragile alliance and controlled participation

At the beginning of the New Order era, the government perceived Islam as 'the most important civil force in society'.⁶⁹ Together with the army, Islamic groups were the largest political forces that strongly supported the New Order in crushing the communists. The period 1966–69 saw a 'honeymoon' between the government, military, students and anti-communist groups, including Islamic organizations.⁷⁰

However, in expecting that its political power in the period of the New Order would increase, the Muslim community had seriously miscalculated. The military/ABRI, which was dominated by officers from the (secular) nationalist group, still had the perception that Islam could threaten political stability and that the Muslim community still wanted to establish an Islamic state. The 'temporary alliance' between the New

Order and Muslims was over by 1969, particularly because government attention was already fully concentrated on the 1971 general election.⁷¹

As Ramage explains, there are at least three characteristics of the New Order's changing perceptions of Islam in the 1970s and 1980s. First, the defeat of communism in Indonesia left Islam as the only major ideological alternative to the New Order itself. Second, the New Order government still had a strong perception of the possibility of the intention of Islamic parties to impose the establishment of an Islamic state or, at least, the implementation of Islamic laws in government policies. Lastly, since *Pancasila* had become *asas tunggal* or the sole foundation of all organizations in 1984–85, then political development should be put behind the need to accelerate the pace of economic development. In other words, the New Order regime put economic development and political stability as the top priority of national development. Hostility to political Islam, then, crystallized in the New Order regime, particularly within the military. As Liddle notes, this attitude of the New Order to the political Islam led to the perception of Islam as 'political enemy number two' after communism.⁷²

The New Order regime produced several policies designed to eliminate the possibility of political instability but which were categorized by many Muslims as anti-Islamic.⁷³ The policies, as Santoso (1995) argues, were aimed at positioning Islam on the periphery of Indonesia's political life. The perception of Islam as a threat to the political system of the New Order pushed the regime together with the military to adopt a policy of containment and of de-politicization of Islam.

One strategy applied by the New Order to contain Islam as a political power was that of 'divide and rule'.⁷⁴ The major aspect of this strategy was that Islam could continue to develop its religious and cultural dimensions without entering the political arena (de-politicization of Islam). This policy caused 'internal conflict' among Muslims in which, as Starkey argues, Soeharto successfully divided the Islamic community.⁷⁵

In order to further de-politicize Islam, the New Order regime began to rationalize the Indonesian political party system by ordering the nine existing political parties, excluding Golkar, to fuse into two parties. The four Islamic parties (*NU*, *Parmusi*, *PSII*, *Perti*) joined to form the PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or United Development Party).

The first indication of the de-politicization of Islam under the New Order came before the 1971 general elections when Soeharto refused to

lift the ban on the *Masyumi*. Then, to replace the *Masyumi*, Soeharto approved the establishment of a new Muslim party, *Parmusi*, on the condition that no prominent former *Masyumi* leader played an active role in the new party. Mohammad Hatta, the former Vice President, also wanted to create another Muslim party, the Islamic Democratic Party of Indonesia (*Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia*), but this was rejected by the New Order regime.⁷⁶

The decisive victory of Golkar (Golongan Karya or Functional Group) in the 1971 election, in which Islamic parties received only 27 percent of the votes cast, as compared with 44 percent at the 1955 election, indicated the decline in Islam's position in Indonesia's politics and the success of Soeharto's policy of de-politicizing Islam.⁷⁷ The election results were not surprising since the government had given Golkar access to the villages and massive financial and political support, both of which were denied to other parties. The 1971 elections marked the final collapse of Islamic parties as effective political forces.⁷⁸

The government further tried to manage, if not to interfere in, Islam and the affairs of religious organizations by forcing them to ratify state policies and pushing them to elect leaders and screen parliamentary candidates acceptable to the regime. This was because the New Order remained very wary of Islamic influences in politics and still tried to ban manifestations of Islam that clearly had political aims to establish an Islamic state.⁷⁹ From 1969, the New Order also controlled the pilgrimage (*hajj*) to Mecca. In addition, the government established the Indonesian Council of *Ulama* (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in 1975, a quasi-official body that coordinated the uneasy relationship between the government and the *ulama*.⁸⁰

The next policy, implemented in 1982, was to apply *Pancasila* as *Kebijaksanaan Asas Tungga* (the sole foundation policy) for all social (including religious) and political organizations for the sake of national stability and unity. The application of 'ideological conformity' aimed at decreasing, if not removing, the influence of ideology and religion in politics. It can also be seen as the New Order's attempt to homogenize the national political platform as the prime foundation for political stability. For the Muslim organizations and community, this process of *Pancasila*-ization was once again perceived as an effort 'to prevent Muslims from ever again becoming an independent base of political power'.⁸¹

Moreover, the inability of Islam to further play a significant role in politics – domestic and international – was due to the absence of any strong political party, organizations or institution that united all Indonesian Muslims.⁸² This was not only because of internal conflict within Islamic groups but, more importantly, because the government successfully prevented the emergence of such an organization. Even though the PPP was the only Islamic political party, it was unable to unite all Indonesian Muslims. This was mainly due to the PPP being established by the New Order. Deliar Noer notes that numerous Islam organizations such as the government-sponsored Indonesian Council of *Ulama*, the Council of the Propagation of Islam, and other social organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah had failed to represent Indonesian Muslims' interests.⁸³ In this context, as Hassan argues, the relationship between the state and religion is influenced by the internal dynamics of Muslim societies.⁸⁴ By applying the above policies/strategies, the New Order regime successfully weakened the power of the Muslim politics so that effectiveness of Islam as a political ideology could be terminated.

However, in the social arena, Islamic organizations were more effective in lobbying the government. The government decisions banning the national sports lottery (*SDSB*), regulating Islamic marriages, supporting Islamic banking, *halal* (religious pure) food labeling and the lifting of the prohibition on the use of *jilbab* (Islamic veil), were some examples of Muslim organizations' influences on government policies.⁸⁵

Despite the New Order regime's success in de-politicizing Islam, in the late 1980s a revival of Islam as a political force was underway, particularly among the young generation. Some observers believed that one of the factors behind the re-emergence of political Islam was the demands of the Muslim community for a stronger political voice in domestic politics.⁸⁶ Another important factor was the Iranian revolution⁸⁷. But others argued that the most important factor was the change in Soeharto's perception of the Muslim community, as discussed in the following section.

Establishment of ICMI: the revival of political Islam or a new source of political legitimacy for the New Order?

From the late 1980s to the 1990s, Soeharto changed his domestic policy and tried to re-build a stronger political coalition with Islam. There were two major reasons for his changed policy towards Islam. The first was

Soeharto's political need to respond to what he perceived to be declining political support for him from the military. Much like his predecessor who once looked to the communists to counteract unhappy army officers, Soeharto now looked to Islam to play the same role. The second reason was the external impact of the political revival of Islam globally. From the late 1970s and early 1980s, the popularity of Islam began to rise significantly in Indonesia. As a source of spiritual, ethical, social and political advice, the Islamic revival in Indonesia was also part of a movement occurring throughout the world, in places as far apart as Iran and Egypt.

The major result of this new relationship between Islam and the New Order occurred in December 1990 when with the support of President Soeharto Dr. B.J. Habibie, the Minister of Research and Technology, established and became chairman of ICMI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* or Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals).⁸⁸ ICMI played a significant role in sponsoring the expansion of the authority of Islamic courts; greater Muslim programming on television (including lessons in the Arabic language); the appointment of ICMI leaders to high office such as cabinet ministers and provincial governors; and establishment of the Islamic Bank *Muamalat* in 1991, the Abdi Bangsa Foundation and the Center of Information and Development Studies (CIDES), considered the association's think-tank, as well as of the Islamic daily newspaper, *Republika*.⁸⁹ With all of the above initiatives undertaken by ICMI, Islam became more assertive politically and economically.

The establishment of ICMI, as Liddle has argued,⁹⁰ was the clearest step taken by Soeharto to accommodate the desires and sensitivities of the Muslim community and deepen his own identification with Islam. Even though the establishment of ICMI invited some public debates and controversies,⁹¹ ICMI, which gained support from almost all government officials and prominent Muslim political activists and intellectuals, can be regarded as the 'sign of the new centrality of Islam in Indonesian public life'.⁹² He further argued that the establishment of ICMI was merely to create a political tool for those in power. Moreover, it was also a 'political move by the government' that accidentally met a demand by the Muslim community for a greater position in politics.⁹³

A similar view was noted by a senior researcher, who said that the establishment of ICMI was an illustration of the 'accommodation' policy of Soeharto in managing the Indonesian Islamic community.⁹⁴ This policy

aimed to please the Muslim community in order to have it express its support and loyalty towards the existing power holder. However, he also argued that 'even though the pressure of the Islamic community was getting stronger in policymaking, Soeharto still had the ultimate authority to control it for the sake of his political interests.'⁹⁵

Some elements of the Islamic community (such as *Nadhlatul Ulama*) and the military, however, strongly resisted the creation of ICMI. K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid of NU contended that 'I am ready anytime to enter and join ICMI, if the fundamentalists, the militants, do not control it, if Professor Habibie does not use it for group interest politics.'⁹⁶ These critics perceived ICMI 'not as a vehicle for Muslim penetration of the state but for state penetration of Islam.'⁹⁷

In the military itself, there was also resistance to acknowledging ICMI due to the fear of re-politicizing the Islamic community.⁹⁸ The secular-nationalist faction of ABRI perceived that the establishment of ICMI would boost the reemergence of Islam as a political force in Indonesian politics, which in turn would jeopardize political stability and national unity. This military faction also suspected that the revival of Islam as indicated by the establishment of ICMI 'would re-open old and divisive debates on whether Indonesia should be an Islamic state.'⁹⁹ This resistance led to the creation, initiated by General Edy Sudrajat, of ICKI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Kebangsaan Indonesia* or the Association of Indonesian Nationalist Intellectuals), which was non-sectarian. However, this association did not get approval from President Soeharto until it changed its name to PCPP (*Persatuan Cendekiawan Pembangunan Pancasila, Intellectuals' Association for the Advancement of the Pancasila*).¹⁰⁰ This was mainly because the former name of the association could give a negative image to the public that there was a conflict between the military and the Indonesian Muslims.

These events indicated that there were endless suspicion by the military towards the emergence of Islam as a major political force in Indonesian politics, which they perceived could jeopardize national unity and stability. Moreover, this also reflected the competition between the Muslim community and secular-nationalists in the military to control policy making of the New Order regime.

The Muslim world in the Cold War era

The rise of the Soviet Union and the United States as superpowers after World War II marked the outbreak of the Cold War and of a bipolar system in international politics. The major manifestation of this bipolar system was the division of nation-states along ideological lines and the emergence of a military alliance system around the globe. As a consequence, Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America were all directly or indirectly affected by the bipolar system of superpower rivalry. As Allison and Williams argue, 'the superpower rivalry is not only unavoidable, it is also both intensive and extensive including the Muslim world.'¹⁰¹ Fred Haliday even notes that the Muslim world, due to its population, massive oil resources, and strategic location, has been the most unstable region in the whole Third World since the 1970s.¹⁰²

Yet the period after World War II was seen in a very different light in many Muslim countries. Islam, not the bipolar division of the world, was seen as the crucial element of world politics. Many independent Muslim states were established between the 1950s and the 1970s in South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa.¹⁰³ For these countries, argues Noor Ahmad Baba, Islam provided 'a strong moral force and source of identity' vis-à-vis their ex-colonial masters. Islam was a 'vital driving force' in their independence struggle against colonialism for many countries, including Indonesia.¹⁰⁴ Further, this process of decolonization, particularly in Asia and Africa, also provided the setting for efforts aimed at Islamic unity.¹⁰⁵ In other words, Islam became an integrative value in many countries in those regions. Some Muslim countries such as Libya and Yemen even rejected the contemporary international system and supported Islamic universalism.¹⁰⁶

Further, this perspective encouraged the establishment of some sort of Islamic bloc, to unite the entire Muslim world, laying down the relationships between individual Muslim states and providing a framework for coordinating them in their international relations, in order to counter the Western and Communist blocs.¹⁰⁷

This phenomenon may be described as 'neo-pan Islamism'.¹⁰⁸ This movement, according to Baba,

is not aimed at restoring Islamic unity as was the pan Islamic movement of nineteenth century, nor is it an indication of the desire to

re-establish the traditional Islamic system of the conduct of external relations. It is rather a desire to cooperate as an Islamic bloc within the community of nations.¹⁰⁹

The major consideration producing the desire to create an Islamic bloc – as Chaudri Nazir Ahmad Khan, a former Attorney-General of Pakistan, put it – was the belief that:

The future of the Muslim countries lies in the strength and their unity ... a common global organization of all Muslim states is essential for safeguarding and promoting the interests of World Muslims.¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, the underlying problem for the establishment of an Islamic bloc was the significant differences among the many Muslim communities in the world. Muslims and Muslim communities are not identical. The world of Islam is not monolithic and the diversity of interpretations, institutions, faith, and practices within the Islamic world is very great. Islam thus inspired two contradictory tendencies: the first towards union, the second towards distinctness.

Moreover, the capacity to unite politically under the banner of the Islamic bloc was also curtailed by other interests, both domestic and international. The discussion of five major world issues below show the interplay of the different domestic interests of the Muslim countries and the interests of the foreign actors, particularly the major powers.

The Arab-Israeli conflict

The Arab-Israeli conflict has had a defining impact on the political development of the Muslim world. It is also a conflict that has made the Middle East 'the most unstable and strategically alarming' region in the whole Third World.¹¹¹

The first Arab-Israeli war occurred in May 1948 when the Palestinian Arabs and Arab League rejected UN Resolution 181, which called for the partition of Palestine into two sovereign states, one Jewish and the other Arab.¹¹² The Israelis, with political and military support from many different countries including the US and Soviet Union, had won the war by December 1948.

The war between Israel and the Arab world resumed in 1956 and continued in 1967, pushed by the pan-Arabism of Nasser of Egypt. Within

six days in 1967, Israel had conquered the Arabs (Egypt, Syria and Jordan) and taken the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Serious political problems in the Middle East continued when an Israeli burnt the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Israeli-occupied Jerusalem on 21 August 1969. This created massive anger and protests from the Muslim world and, as has been seen, led to the establishment of the OIC in the same year.

The Arab-Israeli conflict triggered different perceptions and attitudes among Muslim countries. The conflict even increased intra-Islamic rivalries in the region and the involvement here of the superpowers. Egypt and Jordan, for example, recognized Israel in 1970 and pushed the conflicting parties (the Israelis and Palestinians) to find a comprehensive solution of the conflict. Anwar Sadat of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan were the significant proponents of the peace process dialogue. Other Muslim countries, such as Libya, Iraq and Yemen, criticized the policies and the efforts taken by Egypt and Jordan. They even declared a war against Israel to free the Palestinians from the Israeli occupation. Internationally, this conflict had also become an important area of struggle for influence between the superpowers.

The Arab-Israeli conflict entered a new phase when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. The Israeli invasion not only targeted the PLO but also the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon where many Palestinians were massacred by Christian Lebanese militias under Israeli leadership. This event aroused outrage from Muslims around the world and strengthened support for the Palestinians' struggle against Israel.

More importantly, the ongoing conflict between the Arabs and Israel also further radicalized Islamic militancy.¹¹³ In particular, the Arab-Israeli conflict, still unresolved after more than fifty years, significantly influenced the historical and emotional ties of anti-Western sentiment across the Muslim world and became the focus of attention of many Muslims against the West, particularly the US.

The Iranian revolution and its impact on the world affairs

One of the major events in the Muslim world that had a tremendous effect on both the Muslim world and world affairs generally was the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. The Iranian revolution, which was marked by the fall of Shah Reza Pahlevi, also marked the revival of Islam as a sig-

nificant political force in many Muslim countries. The significance of the Iranian revolution on the Muslim world was that it has accelerated and even radicalized the Islamic revival in many Muslim countries both directly and indirectly.¹¹⁴

The Iranian revolution, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, not only destroyed the old power structure consisting of the Shah, the aristocracy and the Westernized upper and upper middle class but more importantly changed the nature of Iran to become a nation-state based on Islamic orthodoxy (Shiism).¹¹⁵ More importantly, Ayatollah Khomeini appealed for an Islamic *umma* to comprise all Islamic countries and rejected the international system led by the US and USSR. This appeal was based on the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran which held that

all Muslims are one *umma* and the government should exert itself continuously to achieve the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world and the non-alignment with respect to the hegemonist superpowers.¹¹⁶

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the emergence of Islamic states in Central Asia

Although the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was prompted by Moscow's rising frustration with the communist regime of Afghanistan under the leadership of Noor Mohammad Taraki in December 1979, the underlying reasons for the invasion were the geopolitical position of Afghanistan in Central Asia and Moscow's fear of 'Islamic fundamentalist contagion' from revolutionary Iran to Afghanistan and thence into, then, Soviet Central Asia.¹¹⁷ Militarily, the invasion not only brought Soviet forces several hundred kilometers closer to the Persian Gulf, it also triggered significant increases in Soviet military capabilities in the region.

The invasion was also pushed by internal demographic concerns. The 1979 census showed that the Muslim population in Soviet Central Asia had grown five times faster, from 35 million to 49 million during the 1970s, than the rest of the Soviet population.¹¹⁸

The Soviet invasion provoked different responses from the rest of the world. The US, for example, condemned the invasion and rallied the Muslim states of the Middle East against the Soviet Union. When the issue of the invasion of Afghanistan came up for a vote in the UN Secu-

rity Council, only Ethiopia and South Yemen – among Moscow’s Muslim world allies – voted against the resolution that condemned the invasion, while Algeria, Syria, Libya and North Yemen abstained. The anti-Soviet Mujahedeen were supported by the US and other Western countries. They received about US 7 billion in military and economic aid between 1979 and 1989.¹¹⁹

The combination of three different factors – its anti-Iranian policy, Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union and desire to build oil pipelines from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf through Afghanistan – drove the US to support the Mujahedeen.¹²⁰

Islam in Afghanistan was radicalized more by the Soviet invasion than by the revolution in Iran. This was indicated by the emergence of the Mujahedeen in their struggle against the Soviet invasion. Thus, the Soviet invasion, which aimed to prevent the radicalization of the Soviet Union’s own Muslims, strained its relations with the rest of the Muslim world and became a general diplomatic embarrassment to global Soviet prestige.¹²¹

In the end, the radicalization of the Mujahedeen’s struggle over the Soviet occupation and the US support to its struggle gave significant impetus for the emergence of six Muslim republics from the former Soviet Union in the Trans-Caucasus (Azerbaijan) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan).¹²²

The tension between Iran and Iraq

The Iran revolution of 1978–79 also had a momentous significance for other Muslim countries, particularly Iraq. At first, the overthrow of the Shah’s regime by the Islamic revolution was received in Iraq and other Gulf states with mixed feelings. It was perceived that the new regime in Iran would follow a foreign policy sympathetic to the aspirations of other Muslim countries as well as to Arabs more generally. Furthermore, some Baath leaders in Iraq, who were very critical of the Shah’s hegemonic policy, held that the Iranian revolution might provide an opportunity for trust and cooperation with other Muslim countries.¹²³

However, Iran’s message to Iraq and its neighbours was clear: it aimed to export the Iranian revolution and to establish an Islamic government that would enforce Islamic law and deal with domestic and foreign affairs in accordance with Islamic standards.¹²⁴ For Iraq, this Iranian foreign policy was clearly expansionist. So for Iraq, the only certain way

to abort the revisionist policy of Iran was by destroying the source, moral and material, of Shia inspiration: the Khomeini regime.¹²⁵ Saddam Hussein was particularly concerned about the belligerent propaganda of the new revolutionary leadership and its explicit call for the overthrow of the Baathist regime and the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq. He was also worried that the situation in Iran might appeal to Iraq's Shia population and might encourage rebellion from the South of Iraq.¹²⁶ The outbreak of the eight-year Iran–Iraq war in 1980 was the result. Thus, Islam divided the two countries each wanting to be the Gulf's paramount power rather than acted as a unifying force.

The Gulf War in 1991 (Iraq's invasion of Kuwait)

The combination of economic interests (oil) and the need to seize regional leadership in the region were crucial considerations for Iraq to invade Kuwait. Tensions between Iraq and Kuwait were also deeply rooted in history, geography and ideology. Iraq had claimed Kuwait as part of its national territory since the demise of the Ottoman Empire.¹²⁷ Yet, the Iraq interest in Kuwait had less to do with legal or historical rights than the fact that Kuwait possessed mammoth oil wealth.¹²⁸

The Arab states were deeply divided in responding to Iraq's invasion; they were also to diverge on the means for resolving the conflict. The division was essentially between those in the American camp and the so-called radicals. Palestinians and Jordanians spoke of Islamic commitments as they signed up to fight alongside the Iraqis. King Hussein of Jordan, for instance, declared 'this is a war against all Arabs and all Muslims and not against Iraq alone'.¹²⁹ Libya, Yemen and Algeria (Islamist radicals) also gave their support to Saddam. Saddam also found political support not only in Arab lands, but also in non-Arab Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia.

Egypt, however, adopted a tough stance condemning the invasion and even offering to send its volunteers to help save Kuwait and defend Saudi Arabia and the holy places.¹³⁰ Other Arab countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco also gave their support for Kuwait. Muslim countries from different regions such as Turkey, Nigeria and Indonesia urged Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and called on the UN to solve the conflict immediately. The Gulf war thus saw Islam on both sides of the battle lines. There was no single Islamic position on the war,

each faction in multifaceted Islam having its own 'nuanced' and 'interested' view.¹³¹

The Muslim world in the post-Cold War era: The global revival of political Islam

The most prominent feature of international politics in the late 1980s was the collapse of the Soviet power, which resulted in the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, the global political structure and the dynamics of international relations changed dramatically. The bipolar system was swept away and the ideological conflict between the US and USSR disappeared. A new era, labelled the 'new world order', emerged.

The post-Cold War environment has enabled the emergence of societal factors, cultural and religious, as a new focus in global interactions.¹³² Religion, in particular, is now seen to add a serious dimension to international relations.¹³³ In the words of Juergensmeyer, the global interactions in the post-Cold war era are marked by 'the resurgence of parochial identities based on ethnic and religious allegiances.'¹³⁴ In this context, the revival of (political) Islam has become a significant ideological force in the Third World, particularly in the Muslim world.

Islamic revivalists, Mir Zohair Husain argues, can be categorized into four broad types: fundamentalists, traditionalists, modernists, and pragmatists. However, fundamentalists are often perceived by the West as representing the only type of revivalism.¹³⁵ The Islamic revolution in Iran, to a very large extent, has been viewed as a significant example of Islamic fundamentalism. Its implications extend far beyond Iran's border. Further, it has also invigorated the Islamic political struggle in many parts of the Muslim world in Asia, Middle East, and North Africa. Thus, the revival of political Islam in this respect is simultaneously global, regional, national and locally specific.

However, the use of the concept of 'Islamic fundamentalism' is pejorative and misleading in assessing the role of Islam in the Muslim world.¹³⁶ This term can be categorized into two ways, at least, as the term is:

- (1) misunderstood (or at least should be understood in accordance with the proper teaching and guidelines of Islam), and
- (2) now widely used to describe the current conflict, real or imaginary, between Islam and the West.¹³⁷

The failure to distinguish between 'Islamic fundamentalism' and political Islam produces crucial misinterpretations about political Islam. As Bas-sam Tibi argues:

We must never lose sight of the distinction between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism; any promotion of hostility to Islam itself in the guise of a clash of civilization would unwittingly play into the hands of the fundamentalists in their efforts to antagonize the West.¹³⁸

In many Western countries, fundamentalism connotes intolerance, terrorist activities, radicalism, militancy and violence.

Although the Islamic revival is manifested differently in each Islamic country, certain common themes and characteristics are discernible. As Andrew Tan points out:

Islamic revivalism is a result of the Muslim world's disillusionment with Western civilization and its search for an alternative model that would allow for the development of Islamic society organized according to the teachings of Al-Quran. The revivalism is also a reaction against modern Western-style capitalist development.¹³⁹

Thus, the Islamic revival can also be seen as a unifying factor and a focal point for rallying political resistance against both the international system and the state itself. The significant rise of political consciousness of the Indonesian Muslim community, for example, is one of the crucial indicators of the Islamic revival in the post-Cold War era.

The multiplicity of the meanings of the revival of political Islam can also be seen in the effort to establish the 'non-territorial Islamic state'¹⁴⁰ or the cross-border flows of political Islam between (Muslim) groups/entities operating in different countries.¹⁴¹ Khomeini's proclamation that he would export the Islamic revolution to any part of the world, particularly to the Muslim world, was the clearest indicator of the desire to establish an Islamic *umma* that encompasses all Muslim countries.¹⁴² This phenomenon is consistent with the proposition of 'the hyperglobalist thesis' that new forms of religious (social) political organizations will supplant traditional nation-states as the primary political units of world society¹⁴³.

Externally, according to Lubeck the revival of political Islam has been influenced by two factors.¹⁴⁴ Firstly, the Western powers helped to

bring about the rise of the Islamist movement when they encouraged the governments of their client states to eliminate the Leftist ideological movement. The support of the West for the struggle of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989 was an obvious example of this. Secondly, the West helped the international Islamist networks through the promotion of global telecommunications technology. In this context, the rapid development of global communications has facilitated the globalization of political Islam, both on the ideological and operational level, including the spread of activities by Hamas (a radical wing of the Palestinian struggle) to many parts of the Muslim world.

The Western world was convinced that the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union would be followed by the significant emergence of Islam and Islamic potential in international relations. This explained the West's animosity towards Islam as a religion or towards what it called 'politicized Islam'.¹⁴⁵ Hence, Islam was considered by the West as the confronting force leading to the appearance of political Islamic culture, which is the new threat in the wake of the demise of communism.

For many Western countries, the nature of the Islamic threat was not only political but also demographic and socio-religious.¹⁴⁶ Many Western political analysts assumed that the relations of the West and the Muslim world would be conflictual in nature. The Islamic threat, Monshipouri writes, replaced the Soviet threat as the principal strategic threat of the post-Cold war era.¹⁴⁷

Misunderstanding of political Islam, then, led to the perception that, in the post-Cold War world, the global conflict would be between the Muslim world and the West.¹⁴⁸ Surprisingly, some Islamic states, as Gerges points out, seem to confirm Western perception of an Islamic threat by affirming that they would replace the Soviet Union as the major challenge to the West.¹⁴⁹ Some Islamic states, such as Iran and Sudan, see their primary task as 'resisting growing Western influences on the institutions, policies, and more importantly, the identity of the Muslim societies from the symptoms of Westoxification and socio-cultural contamination'.¹⁵⁰

As Peter Chalk has argued, Iran and Sudan have sponsored the violent manifestation of Islamic identity and adopted the militant concept of the *al-jihad al saghir* (the holy war), which emphasized legitimate forms

of strife with other humans through war and violence as an integral part of their domestic and foreign policy.¹⁵¹

The tragedy of September 11 in the United States, followed by other terrorist attacks in many regions of the world, including in Indonesia, marked the end of the post-Cold War era in international relations. Further, it has also seen the revival of radical Islam in general and in Indonesia in particular, which has produced more complicated situations in global politics. The Western world argued that the revival of radical Islam has been one of the prime reasons for the emergence of Islamic terrorism. To borrow the RAND Corporation study of Angel M. Rabasa et al, the sources of Islamic radicalism that produced (Islamic) religious terrorism can be classified into three classes: conditions, process and catalytic events as shown in the figure below.¹⁵²

The revival of radical Islam has become a significant ideological force in the Third World, particularly in the Muslim world. The rise of many Islamic movements emerged in the wake of specific social and political crises in many Muslim world, including Indonesia. In the post-Soeharto Indonesia, the number of Islamic radical groups has significantly increased in politics since the late 1990s especially in the current situation

Sources of Islamic radicalism

Conditions	Failed political and economic models Structural anti-Westernism Decentralization of religious power in Sunni Islam
Processes	The Islamic resurgence Arabization of the non-Arab Muslim world External funding of religious fundamentalism and extremism The convergence of Islamism and tribalism Growth of radical Islamic networks Emergence of the mass media The Palestinian-Israeli and Kashmir conflicts
Catalytic events	The Iranian revolution The Afghan war The Gulf war 1991 September 11 and the global war on terrorism The Iraq war 2003

of the post-September 11 international system. It means that the religious (Islamic) factor in Indonesia's politics will become a more significant factor in the future due to the greater convergence of the domestic (societal) and the Muslim world (transnational) dimensions.

Notes

1. Interview with a former foreign minister, 30 November 1999.
2. President KH Abdurachman Wahid's statement on the commemoration of *Nuzulul Quran* at the Istiqlal Mosque, 25 December 1999 (*Kompas*, 26 December 1999).
3. The original title of the speech is 'Mendayung Di antara dua karang' [Rowing between two reefs]. This speech was made before the *Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat* (Central Indonesian National Committee) on 2 September 1948 in Yogyakarta. See Anak Agung (1973), p. 23.
4. Weinstein (1976), p. 161.
5. See Rosenau (1976), p. 16.
6. Sukma (1995), p. 309.
7. Moh. Hatta as quoted in Anak Agung (1973), p. 26.
8. Ibid.
9. Hatta, Indonesia's foreign policy. In *Foreign Affairs*, 1953, quoted in Djiwandono (1994).
10. Sukma (1999b), p. 8.
11. Sukma, Rizal (1995), p. 308. See also Sukma (1997), p. 232.
12. Anak Agung (1973), p. 29.
13. Suryadinata (1996), p. 27.
14. Anak Agung (1973), p. 184.
15. Ibid.
16. See Anak Agung (1973); Weinstein (1976); Suryadinata (1996); Sukma (1997).
17. Prasad (2001), p. 7.
18. Ibid.
19. See Leifer (1983a), p. 56; Starkey (1991), p. 281; Sukma (1995), p. 309.
20. Suryadinata (1996), p. 29.

21. Starkey (1991), p. 274.
22. Leifer (1983b), p. 151.
23. Leifer (1983a), p. 60.
24. For further elaboration on this issue, see for example Anak Agung (1973) and Djiwandono (1996).
25. Leifer (1983a), p. 61.
26. Sukma (1997), p. 233.
27. Smith (2001).
28. Leifer (1983a), p. 56.
29. For a recent analysis of the close relationship between the PRC and PKI, see Sukma (1999).
30. Warshawsky (1974), p. 202.
31. Starkey (1991), p. 284.
32. These five principles were belief in one God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy through deliberation, and social justice for the Indonesian people. The New Order took a more authoritarian interpretation of *Pancasila*. See Eklöf (1999), p. 6.
33. Sukma (1995), p. 311.
34. Anwar (1994), p. 35.
35. Sukma (1995), p. 310.
36. Sukma (1999c), p. 122.
37. Special edition on Indonesia's foreign policy during the New Order, *Kompas*, 1 July 2001.
38. For a more comprehensive elaboration on Indonesia's foreign policy and ASEAN, see Anwar (1994).
39. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
40. Starkey (1991). pp.288-289.
41. This concept refers to regional relations in Southeast Asia, Indonesia's relations with the West and Indonesia's relations in multilateral forum (UN).
42. See Bandoro (1994), pp. 12–50.
43. See Bandoro (1994). pp. 93–124.
44. Bandoro (1994), p. 3.

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45. See Weinstein (1976), p. 200.
46. Leifer (1983a), p. 116.
47. Ibid.
48. Special edition on Indonesia's foreign policy during the New Order, *Kompas* 1 July 2001.
49. The issue of Indonesia's involvement in the OIC will be elaborated more comprehensively in Chapter 3.
50. Interview with a foreign policy analyst from LIPI, 9 August 1999.
51. See OIC Secretariat (1995).
52. Rosyadi (1981), p. 15.
53. See McMichael (1987), Vatikiotis (1995).
54. Sukma (1995), p. 313, Suryadinata (1996), p. 51, Vatikiotis (1995), p. 217.
55. The statement of Indonesia's foreign minister, Ali Alatas as quoted in Suryadinata (1996), p. 176.
56. Bandoro (1994), p. 251.
57. Indonesia's policy to the conflict of Bosnia is elaborated in Chapter 6.
58. This issue is elaborated in Chapter 4
59. Djwandono (1994), pp. 98-99.
60. Ibid., p. 96.
61. Several interviews with senior diplomats on 9 August, 30 September and 25 November 1999.
62. Jiwandono (1994), p. 100.
63. Sukma (1999), p. 60; Suryadinata (1996), pp. 101-117.
64. See Sukma (1994).
65. Sukma (1995), p. 313.
66. Ibid., p. 315; Suryadinata (1996), p. 181.
67. See Sukma (1997).
68. Ibid.
69. Samson (1985), p. 165.
70. Vickers (2001), p. 73.
71. Noer (1983), p. 193.

72. Ibid.
73. Santoso (1995), p. 3.
74. Starkey (1991), pp. 103–105.
75. Ibid., p. 104.
76. Ibid. p.10.
77. Samson. (1985), p. 167.
78. Crouch (1981), p. 203.
79. Dijk (1991), p. 81.
80. Noer (1983), p. 195.
81. See Hefner (1993), p. 4. A discussion can also be found in Hefner and Horvatic (1997), p. 78.
82. This statement was argued by Dr. Deliar Noer, an Islamic scholar who was very critical to the New Order regime. *The Jakarta Post*, 30 January 1995.
83. Ibid.
84. Hassan (2002), p. 148.
85. Hefner (1999b), p. 43.
86. Ibid. p. 164.
87. Schwarz (1999), p. 173.
88. For a clear chronological elaboration of the ICMI, see Hefner (1999b). See also Thaba (1996), pp. 290–300.
89. *The Jakarta Post*, 28 December 1983. See also Hefner (1999b), p. 50 and Azra (2001), p. 34.
90. Liddle (1999), pp. 60–61.
91. There are at least three different interpretations of the purposes of ICMI – namely political, social and economic. First, some groups of Indonesian society (Christian minority and non-*santri*) perceived ICMI as ‘the opening wedge in a new attempt to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state’ and as ‘a typical example of New Order bureaucratic politics.’ Second, the main goal of ICMI was seen as ‘to improve the quality of human resources in Indonesia.’ Lastly, ICMI could serve as ‘a weapon in a struggle of ordinary Indonesians against the predatory business elite of the New Order-style capitalist development.’ See Liddle (1996a).
92. Ibid. p. 614.

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93. Interview with William Liddle, in the *Jakarta Post*, 13 March 1995.
94. Interview with an Indonesian scholar, 4 November 1999.
95. Ibid.
96. Schwarz (1999), p. 142.
97. Heffner (1999b), p. 50.
98. Lowry (1996), p. 197.
99. Schwarz (1999), p. 173.
100. Ibid.
101. Allison and Williams (1990), p. 1.
102. Haliday (1996), p. 11.
103. Landau (1990), p. 248.
104. Baba (1994), p. 29
105. Moinuddin (1987), p. 69.
106. Landau 1990, p. 259.
107. Ibid., p. 269.
108. Baba (1994), p. 30.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid., p. 274.
111. Haliday (1996), p. 11.
112. Hussain (1995), p. 181.
113. Shlaim (1999), p. 58.
114. Husain (1995), p. 275.
115. Hiro (1985), p. 185.
116. Stempel (1981), p. 169.
117. Mazrui (1994), p. 508–509.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid., p. 507.

122. Pipes (1994), p. 155.
123. Khadduri (1988), p. 68.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
125. Hiro (1990), p. 37.
126. Danreuther (1992), p. 9.
127. See Booker (1991), p. 194.
128. Freedman and Karsh (1993), p. 45.
129. Landes (1991).
130. Baker (1994), p. 482.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 484.
132. For further discussion on this issue, see Huntington (1996), especially chapter.1.
133. *Ibid.*
134. Cited in Ehteshami (1997), p. 179.
135. Husain (1995), p. 270.
136. Vertigans and Sutton (2002).
137. See Choudhury (1993), p. 218.
138. See Tibi (1998), p. xii.
139. Tan (2000), p. 93.
140. Paz (2001).
141. Cox et al (1999).
142. Stempel (1981), p. 169.
143. Held et al (1999), p. 3.
144. 'The Other Side of Globalisation', an interview with Professor Paul M. Lubeck. At www.southreview.com, accessed 5 October 2001.
145. Alawi (1994), p. 28.
146. Esposito (1992), p. 175.
147. Monshipouri (1988).
148. One of the most controversial scholars who argued about the changing nature of global conflict between cultures (civilizations) is Samuel P. Huntington. (1996).

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149. Gerges (1999), p. 17.

150. Karawan (1997), p. 52.

151. Chalk (1997), p. 9.

152. Rabasa et al (2004).